Mercer Law Review
Volume 71
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 13

1-2020

Local Government Law
Russell A. Britt
Michael C. Pruett
Jennifer D. Herzog
Brittanie Browning
Jacob Stalvey O'Neal

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Britt, Russell A.; Pruett, Michael C.; Herzog, Jennifer D.; Browning, Brittanie; O'Neal, Jacob Stalvey; and
Cunningham, Pearson (2020) "Local Government Law," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 71 : No. 1 , Article 13.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol71/iss1/13

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Local Government Law
Authors
Russell A. Britt, Michael C. Pruett, Jennifer D. Herzog, Brittanie Browning, Jacob Stalvey O'Neal, and
Pearson Cunningham

This survey article is available in Mercer Law Review: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol71/iss1/13

[11] LOCAL GOVERNMENT-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

11/26/2019 11:13 AM

Local Government Law
by Russell A. Britt,* Michael C. Pruett,** Jennifer D.
Herzog,*** Brittanie Browning,**** Jacob Stalvey O’Neal,*****
and Pearson Cunningham******

I. INTRODUCTION1
Another banner year for local governments. A gubernatorial veto
preserves, for now, the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Lathrop v.

*Partner, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (A.B., cum
laude, 2003); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2011).
Member, State Bar of Georgia (Member, Constitutional Law Section, Local Government
Section, and School & College Law Section); Defense Research Institute (Member,
Governmental Liability Committee; Sponsorship Chair, 2019 DRI Civil Rights and
Governmental Tort Liability Conference).
**Partner, Hall Booth Smith P.C., Athens, Georgia; University of Georgia (B.B.A.,
magna cum laude, 1988); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., summa cum laude,
1991). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
***Partner, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Tifton, Georgia; Presbyterian College (B.A., summa
cum laude, 2003); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2006). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
****Associate, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State University (B.A.,
summa cum laude, 2010); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., 2014). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
*****Associate, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A.,
summa cum laude, 2010); University of Virginia School of Law (J.D., 2013). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
******Associate, Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.A.,
2013); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2018). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
1. For a survey of local government law during the prior survey period, see
Christian Henry, Russell A. Britt, Michael C. Pruett, Jennifer D. Herzog, Nick Kinsley,
Jacob Stalvey O’Neal & Phillip E. Friduss, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 177 (2018).
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Deal2 that held sovereign immunity bars declaratory and injunctive
relief claims against the state, including challenges to constitutionality
under the state constitution.3 In the world of tax, some clarification on
appraisal methodologies feature alongside cases notable for their
unique procedural postures. A Georgia Supreme Court decision 4 fleshes
out what is required for a “meaningful” hearing to be afforded under
zoning procedures law. Last year’s developments in the Open Meetings 5
and Open Records Acts6 continue to bear fruit, and statutory
construction comes front and center to this year’s developments in
Whistleblower Act7 case law.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
This survey period recognizably did not include a decision on
sovereign immunity8 with more implications than the Lathrop v. Deal9
decision discussed in last year’s article; 10 however, interesting
developments on the issue continue to arise. In City of Albany v.
Stanford,11 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed whether a city is
entitled to sovereign immunity from a nuisance that purportedly
endangers life.12 The facts involved the City of Albany continuing to
re-issue an occupational tax certificate to a business to operate a
recording studio and entertainment facility, despite knowledge of
allegations that the business was operating a night club and serving
alcohol without a permit. The city also had knowledge of multiple police
raids on the establishment, which uncovered evidence of alcohol sales,
2. 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017).
3. See infra notes 4, 76.
4. Hoechstetter v. Pickens Cty., 303 Ga. 786, 815 S.E. 2d 50 (2018).
5. O.C.G.A § 50-14-1 (2019).
6. O.C.G.A § 50-18-70 (2019).
7. O.C.G.A § 45-1-4 (2019).
8. The Georgia Constitution provides:
[S]overeign immunity extends to the state and all of its departments and
agencies. The sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and
agencies can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which
specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent
of such waiver.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(e).
9. 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017) (holding that sovereign immunity bars
declaratory and injunctive relief claims against the State, including challenges to a law’s
constitutionality under the Georgia Constitution).
10. See Henry et al., supra note 1, at 178–82.
11. 347 Ga. App. 95, 815 S.E.2d 322 (2018) (physical precedent), cert. denied, 2019
Ga. LEXIS 294 (Ga. Apr. 29, 2019).
12. Id. at 98, 815 S.E.2d at 325.
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weapons, and drugs. The plaintiffs, as the co-administrators of a
murder victim’s estate, alleged that the dangerous conditions in and
around the business establishment, of which the city was aware,
resulted in a nuisance and the shooting death of the murder victim. 13
The city argued it was entitled to sovereign immunity, while the
plaintiff contended that such immunity “[did] not apply because cities
have always been responsible for damages caused by nuisances
maintained by the city that endanger life.”14 The court of appeals,
however, determined that there was no “[nuisance] ‘exception’
applicable to the facts of this case.”15 First, although a “nuisance
exception” to sovereign immunity is available in cases involving a
taking of property, such “exception” does not apply in this case “where
the ‘damage’ is injury to a person or loss of life.” 16
Second, the city did not waive its sovereign immunity under the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated section 36-33-1(b),17 as the plaintiffs
suggested.18 Section 36-33-1(b) “provides a narrow waiver of a
municipal corporation’s sovereign immunity ‘[f]or neglect to perform or
[for] improper or unskillful performance of their ministerial duties[.]’” 19
In the context of this code section, “ministerial functions” for which a
municipality may be liable involve “the exercise of some private
franchise, or some franchise conferred upon the municipality by law
which it may exercise for the private profit or convenience of the
municipality or for the convenience of its citizens alone, in which the
general public has no interest.”20 Conversely, municipalities are entitled
to assert sovereign immunity for “governmental functions,” which are
“of a purely public nature, intended for the benefit of the public at large,
without pretense of private gain to the municipality.” 21 Applied to the
facts of this case, and without deciding whether the issuance of an
occupational tax certificate is “ministerial,” the court of appeals
determined that “the decision of when and whether to revoke an
occupational tax certificate is a governmental function because it is the
13. Id. at 95–96, 815 S.E.2d at 324.
14. Id. at 98, 815 S.E.2d at 325.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 98–99, 815 S.E.2d at 326.
17. The text of O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(b) (2019) reads, in full: “Municipal corporations
shall not be liable for failure to perform or for errors in performing their legislative or
judicial powers. For neglect to perform or improper or unskillful performance of their
ministerial duties, they shall be liable.”
18. Stanford, 347 Ga. App. at 99, 815 S.E.2d at 326.
19. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(b)).
20. Id. at 100, 815 S.E.2d at 326 (quotations and citation omitted).
21. Id. at 99, 815 S.E.2d at 326 (quotations and citation omitted).
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exercise of the city’s police power, which is inherently discretionary.” 22
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the city was entitled to
sovereign immunity and reversed the trial court’s denial of the city’s
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.23
The dissent, however, opined that “the majority’s opinion applies an
inapplicable line of precedent and thereby writes this longstanding and
important [nuisance] exception to the protection of sovereign immunity
out of Georgia law.”24 The dissent pointed to precedent holding that a
municipality may be liable for damages it causes to a third party from
the creation or maintenance of a nuisance—regardless of whether the
municipality was performing a governmental function. 25 The dissent
further pointed to the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding in City of
Thomasville v. Shank,26 where the supreme court held that “‘a
municipality is liable for creating or maintaining a nuisance which
constitutes either a danger to life and health or a taking of property.’”27
The dissent agreed with the majority’s conclusion that cases involving
the taking of property without just and adequate compensation do not
apply to this case; however, cases involving a nuisance that is
dangerous to life and health do apply.28
The majority acknowledged the holding in Shank, but determined
that it was later clarified in Georgia Department of Natural Resources v.
Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc.29 by the Georgia Supreme Court.30
According to the majority, the supreme court in Sustainable Coast held
that “the ‘nuisance exception’ recognized in Shank was not an exception
at all, but instead, a proper recognition that the Constitution itself
requires just compensation for takings and cannot, therefore, be
understood to afford immunity in such cases.”31 And “such an ‘exception’
for cases triggering application of the eminent domain clause of the
Constitution does not apply here in this case where the ‘damage’ is
injury to a person or loss of life.”32

22. Id. at 100–01, 815 S.E.2d at 327.
23. Id. at 101, 815 S.E.3d at 327.
24. Id. at 104–05, 815 S.E.2d at 330 (Ellington, P.J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 103–04, 815 S.E.2d at 329 (Ellington, P.J., dissenting).
26. 263 Ga. 624, 437 S.E.2d 306 (1993).
27. Stanford, 347 Ga. App. at 104, 815 S.E.2d at 329 (Ellington, P.J., dissenting)
(quoting Shank, 263 Ga. at 625, 437 S.E.2d at 307).
28. Id. at 104, 815 S.E.2d at 329 (Ellington, P.J., dissenting).
29. 294 Ga. 593, 755 S.E.2d 184 (2014).
30. Stanford, 347 Ga. App. at 98, 815 S.E.2d at 325–26 (majority opinion).
31. Id. at 98, 815 S.E.2d at 326.
32. Id. at 98–99, 815 S.E.2d at 326.
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Concurring fully and specially, the concurrence noted, although a
municipality cannot assert sovereign immunity in defending against a
private nuisance claim, the court was unaware of any precedent holding
a municipality liable for a private nuisance “where the alleged nuisance
resulted in personal injury to a member of the public, as opposed to the
owner or occupier of the property.”33 And “given the rationale for the
[nuisance] exception—that the government may not unreasonably
interfere with private property rights—[the concurrence saw] no basis
for extending the exception to include claims [resulting in personal
injury to a member of the public].”34 Moreover, to the extent the
plaintiff attempted to assert a public nuisance claim, the concurrence
noted that there was no precedent extending the “nuisance exception”
to sovereign immunity for such a claim. 35 The concurrence therefore
agreed that the city was entitled to sovereign immunity. 36
The majority opinion provided a significant victory to the city by
reversing a $10,640,000 judgment.37 More importantly, the physical
precedent decision38 provides persuasive authority for limiting the
“nuisance exception” to sovereign immunity for municipalities going
forward.
In Fulton County School District. v. Jenkins,39 the Georgia Court of
Appeals reaffirmed the limitation on school districts’ waiver of
sovereign immunity for incidents involving a school bus. 40 The
allegations in the complaint involved a bus driver failing to ensure a
special needs student exited the bus at school. As a result, the student
allegedly remained on the bus while parked in the school’s
transportation-system parking lot for the evening, unwittingly locked
inside the bus by the driver.41
The school district moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it was
entitled to sovereign immunity. The plaintiff argued that sovereign

33. Id. at 102, 815 S.E.2d at 328 (Gobeil, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 103, 815 S.E.2d at 329 (Gobeil, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 102–03, 815 S.E.2d at 328–29 (Gobeil, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 103, 815 S.E.2d at 329 (Gobeil, J., concurring).
37. See id. at 96, 815 S.E.2d at 324 (majority opinion).
38. See GA. CT. APP. R. 33.2 (a)(1) (“An opinion is physical precedent only (citable as
persuasive, but not binding, authority) . . . with respect to any portion of the published
opinion in which any of the panel judges concur in the judgment only, concur specially
without a statement of agreement with all that is said in the majority opinion, or
dissent.”).
39. 347 Ga. App. 448, 820 S.E.2d 75 (2018).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 448, 870 S.E.2d at 76.
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immunity was waived by O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1090,42 which requires school
districts to have insurance policies covering school children, and
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b),43 which expressly provides a waiver of sovereign
immunity for injuries arising from the operation and use of a
government entity’s motor vehicle.44 The trial court concluded that
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1090 waived the school district’s sovereign immunity
for the plaintiff’s claims.45
The court of appeals reversed, noting that its earlier decision in
Rawls v. Bulloch County School District 46 foreclosed the argument that
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1090 somehow waived a school district’s sovereign
immunity.47 The court’s holding relied on the fact that O.C.G.A.
§ 20-2-1090 does not provide express language waiving sovereign
immunity or the extent of such waiver. 48
The court of appeals contrasted O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51,49 which does
provide an express waiver of sovereign immunity and the extent of the
waiver.50 However, the court of appeals held that O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51
did not apply to this case because, as in Rawls, there was no vehicular
accident as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51.51 Thus, the court of
appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the school district’s motion to
dismiss.52
During the survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed on
multiple occasions the requirement of a written contract in order to
waive a local government’s sovereign immunity for breach of contract
claims. In Browning v. Rabun County Board of Commissioners,53 the
wife of a deceased county employee brought a breach of contract claim
after she was denied proceeds from an optional life insurance policy. 54
The record did not contain an enrollment form signed by the deceased
for the election of coverage under the optional policy. 55 And even though
42. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1090 (2019).
43. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (2019).
44. Jenkins, 347 Ga. App. at 449, 870 S.E.2d at 76.
45. Id.
46. 223 Ga. App. 234, 477 S.E.2d 383 (1996).
47. Jenkins, 347 Ga. App. at 451, 820 S.E.2d at 77–78.
48. Id. at 451–52, 820 S.E.2d at 78.
49. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (2019).
50. Jenkins, 347 Ga. App. at 452–53, 820 S.E.2d at 78–79.
51. Id. at 453–54, 820 S.E.2d at 79.
52. Id. at 454, 820 S.E.2d at 79.
53. 347 Ga. App. 719, 820 S.E.2d 737 (2018), cert. denied, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 424 (Ga.
June 3, 2019).
54. Id. at 719–20, 820 S.E.2d at 738–39.
55. Id. at 723, 820 S.E.2d at 741.
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there was a summary of benefits that purported to show the deceased
was enrolled in the optional policy, the court of appeals held that the
summary of benefits was not a written contract between the county and
the deceased because it was not signed by either party and it did not
show “the assent of the parties to the contract or contain any terms
other than the monthly premium.”56 Accordingly, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the claim was barred by sovereign
immunity.57
In Cobb County School District v. Learning Center Foundation of
Central Cobb, Inc.,58 a charter school sued the school district, alleging
that the school district violated the Charter Schools Act59 by treating
the charter school less favorably than other local schools. 60 The school
district moved to dismiss, contending that the claim was barred by
sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion, finding that by
entering the charter agreement, pursuant to the Charter Schools Act,
the school district agreed to be bound by the provisions of the Charter
Schools Act.61 The court of appeals agreed, holding that the plain
language of the Charter Schools Act “does more than recite that the
parties to a charter are bound by the Act.”62 It instead “creates the basic
terms of a charter agreement by stating that the parties to a charter
‘agree to be bound’ ‘as if’ the provisions of the Act were replicated
word-for-word in the charter agreement.”63 Thus, the court of appeals
held that the school district’s sovereign immunity was waived as to the
plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. 64 However, this decision is physical
precedent only,65 with the dissent contending that sovereign immunity
was not waived because it did not believe the plain language of
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-2062(1)66 incorporated the Charter Schools Act into the
charter agreement—the statute merely declares “that those who enter
into a charter have agreed that their charter is a contract governed by
the Charter Schools Act.”67
56. Id. at 722–23, 820 S.E.2d at 740.
57. Id.
58. 348 Ga. App. 66, 821 S.E.2d 127 (2018).
59. O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-2060–20-2-2076 (2019).
60. Learning Ctr. Found. of Cent. Cobb, 348 Ga. App. at 66, 821 S.E.2d at 128.
61. Id. at 67, 821 S.E.2d at 128.
62. Id. at 69, 821 S.E.2d at 129.
63. Id. at 69, 821 S.E.2d at 129–30.
64. Id. at 69, 821 S.E.2d at 130.
65. See GA. CT. APP. R. 33.2 (a)(1); see also supra note 38.
66. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-2062(1) (2019).
67. Learning Ctr. Found. of Cent. Cobb, 348 Ga. App. at 71, 821 S.E.2d at 131
(Ellington, P.J., dissenting).
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In Shelnutt v. Mayor of Savannah,68 firefighters brought a breach of
contract claim, alleging they were paid less than what the City of
Savannah’s written pay policy required. The firefighters argued that
the city modified the terms of the pay policy through its course of
conduct.69 However, the court of appeals determined that, regardless of
the city’s conduct, the city was entitled to sovereign immunity against
the breach of contract claim in the absence a written contract. 70
In Fulton County v. City of Atlanta,71 a case challenging the
annexation of property in Fulton County, the Georgia Supreme Court
noted the unique circumstances where courts may reach the merits of a
case before addressing the jurisdictional issue of sovereign immunity.72
The supreme court held that, even if sovereign immunity would bar
claims against the city and city officials in their official capacities, it
would not bar the claims against the city officers in their individual
capacities.73 The supreme court therefore would have to address the
constitutionality of the subject annexation ordinance in any event. 74
And because it determined that the subject annexation ordinance was
never properly enacted, the supreme court was able to affirm the trial
court’s judgment in favor of the city, regardless of whether the city was
entitled to sovereign immunity.75
Finally, following the General Assembly’s inability to pass legislation
during the 2018 legislative session in response to Lathrop v. Deal,76 it
successfully passed House Bill 31177 during the 2019 legislative session.
The bill provided for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for
declaratory or injunctive relief claims to remedy an injury in fact caused
by government entities or government officials in their official capacity
in violation of a state statute, the Georgia Constitution, or the United
States Constitution.78 The proposed waiver also extended to declaratory
and injunctive relief claims against enforcement of a state statute, on
68. 349 Ga. App. 499, 826 S.E.2d 379 (2019).
69. Id. at 504, 826 S.E.2d at 384.
70. Id. at 505, 826 S.E.2d at 384.
71. 305 Ga. 342, 825 S.E.2d 142 (2019).
72. Id. at 342 n.3, 825 S.E.2d at 143 n.3.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017) (holding sovereign immunity bars declaratory
and injunctive relief claims against the State, including challenges to a law’s
constitutionality under the Georgia Constitution); see Ga. H.R. Bill 791, Reg. Sess. (2017)
(unenacted).
77. Ga. H.R. Bill 311, Reg. Sess. (2019) (unenacted).
78. Id.
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the basis that the statute, on its face or as applied, violates the Georgia
or United States Constitution.79 The proposed waiver would not apply,
inter alia, to the recovery of monetary relief, attorney’s fees, or expenses
of litigation except as provided in O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14.80 Stakeholders
believed this attempted response to the Lathrop decision would be
signed into law. However, the governor surprisingly vetoed the bill,
stating that when “considering the possible ramifications of a [sovereign
immunity] wavier, it is essential that the provisions be appropriately
tailored in conjunction with the executive branch to provide pathways
for judicial intervention without unduly interfering with the daily
operations of the state.”81 Accordingly, the seminal Lathrop decision
again remains the controlling law on sovereign immunity’s application
to declaratory and injunctive relief claims for at least one more year.
III. OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Following significant discussions and holdings by the Georgia
Supreme Court on the topic of official immunity 82 in Lathrop v. Deal83
and Barnett v. Caldwell,84 this survey period proved less eventful.
Nevertheless, certain justices of the Georgia Supreme Court signaled an
appetite for a significant review of the doctrine’s applicability to local
government employees in Wyno v. Lowndes County.85
In Wyno, the plaintiff, whose wife was attacked and killed by a
neighbor’s dog, brought suit against Lowndes County and four
individual Lowndes County Animal Control employees. Leading up to
the attack, numerous complaints about the dogs at the neighbor’s
address had been filed with the animal control office. The plaintiff

79. Id.
80. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (2019).
81. Veto Statement No. 5 (2019), GOVERNOR BRIAN P. KEMP OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNOR, https://gov.georgia.gov/documents/2019-veto-statements (last visited July 23,
2019).
82. The Georgia Constitution provides:
[A local government officer] may be subject to suit and may be liable for
injuries and damages caused by the negligent performance of, or negligent
failure to perform, [his] ministerial functions and may be liable for injuries and
damages if [he] act[s] with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury
in the performance of [his] official functions.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(d).
83. 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017); see Henry et al., supra note 1, at 182–83.
84. 302 Ga. 845, 809 S.E.2d 813 (2018); see Henry et al., supra note 1, at 184–85.
85. 305 Ga. 523, 824 S.E.2d 297 (2019).
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therefore alleged that the employees negligently failed to perform
ministerial duties as to the allegedly dangerous dog.86
The employees asserted immunity under former O.C.G.A. § 4-8-30,87
a portion of the Responsible Dog Ownership Law that purports to
exempt local governments and their employees from liability arising
from their enforcement of, or failure to enforce, that law and local
dog-control ordinances.88 Although the plaintiff challenged the
constitutionality of former O.C.G.A. § 4-8-30, the supreme court did not
reach the constitutional question because it determined that the
employees were protected by official immunity from the claims. 89
Specifically, the supreme court rejected the trial court’s conclusion
that the Lowndes County Animal Control Ordinance established
ministerial duties; it instead determined that the reference duties
under the ordinance were discretionary in nature. 90 “Although the
ordinance directs animal control officers to make investigations and
inquiries upon receiving a complaint, such [actions are] for the purpose
of determining whether the [complaint] . . . describes a dog that is
vicious, dangerous, or potentially dangerous, as described [by]
the . . . [o]rdinance.”91 The supreme court found “[t]his initial
determination [to] necessarily require[] the exercise of judgment and
the application of a legal standard to specific facts before determining
that further action is required.”92 Further, “even if [an employee]
determines that a dog is ‘dangerous’ or ‘potentially dangerous’
[pursuant to the ordinance], the [employee] has a range of enforcement
options at his or her disposal.” 93 Thus, the supreme court held that the
employees had “significant discretion with regard to the handling of
each complaint.”94
The record also was devoid of any evidence that the employees
harbored ill will or malice towards the plaintiff or his deceased wife or
that the employees intentionally conducted their investigations of dog
complaints in a manner so as to harm the plaintiff or his deceased
wife.95 The supreme court therefore held that the plaintiff did not

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 524, 824 S.E.2d at 299–300.
O.C.G.A. § 4-8-30 (2011).
Wyno, 305 Ga. at 524–25 & n.1, 824 S.E.2d at 300 & n.1.
Id. at 523–24, 824 S.E.2d at 299.
Id. at 528–30, 824 S.E.2d at 302–03.
Id. at 530, 824 S.E.2d at 303.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 533, 824 S.E.2d at 305.
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satisfy his burden of demonstrating in the record that any of the
employees acted with actual malice or intended to cause the plaintiff or
his deceased wife harm. 96 Absent evidence of a discretionary act taken
with actual malice, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the employees.97
In light of the facts from this case, the decision’s holding was
predictable. The decision’s concurrence, however, was not. It suggests
that the supreme court may want to reconsider some or all of the
precedents applying official immunity to county and municipal
employees under Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX(d) of the Georgia
Constitution,98 as well as the interplay between that constitutional
provision and the provision found under Article IX, Section II,
Paragraph IX99 of the Georgia Constitution. 100 Three justices joined the
concurrence’s author,101 thus signaling that a significant review of these
issues may occur in the near future.
In Ortega v. Coffey,102 the plaintiff sued a county road
superintendent, among others, following the death of her husband and
injury of her minor son in a vehicle accident. The plaintiff alleged that
the road superintendent failed to inspect the roadway which caused her
husband’s death and son’s injuries.103 The trial court granted summary
judgment to the road superintendent, finding that he was entitled to
official immunity.104 The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed.105
Despite the plaintiff testifying that she had complained to the road
superintendent about the poor condition of the road, as well as
presenting evidence of other complaints about the road,
there was no evidence of any policy, written or unwritten, directive or
law establishing the manner in which [the road superintendent] was
required to inspect, repair or maintain the roadway. Instead, the
evidence demonstrated that, although [the] road superintendent . . .
was responsible for maintaining the county roadways, there were no
required scheduled inspections and no written policy, instruction or

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Ga. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(d).
99. This provision provides: “The General Assembly may waive the immunity of
counties, municipalities, and school districts by law.” Ga. CONST. art. I § 2, para. 9.
100. Wyno, 305 Ga. at 533–34, 824 S.E.2d at 305–06 (Nahmias, P.J., concurring).
101. Id. at 534, 824 S.E.2d at 306 (Nahmias, P.J., concurring).
102. 348 Ga. App. 794, 824 S.E.2d 690 (2019).
103. Id. at 794, 824 S.E.2d at 692–93.
104. Id. at 796–97, 824 S.E.2d at 694.
105. Id. at 797, 824 S.E.2d at 694.
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directions about how the roadways should be maintained or how to
respond to issues with the roadways.106

The court of appeals therefore determined that the road
superintendent “exercised personal deliberation and judgment to
maintain the roadways and such actions were discretionary.” 107 And,
because the plaintiff’s contention that the road superintendent acted
“with reckless disregard for the safety of others” did not rise to the level
of “actual malice necessary to overcome official immunity for
discretionary acts,” the grant of summary judgment in favor of the road
superintendent was affirmed.108 This decision highlights the fact that
when local governments craft policies and procedures, a “less is more”
approach may provide a better opportunity to avoid the creation of
ministerial duties that potentially could strip their employees’ of official
immunity.
In Llewelyn v. Bryant,109 a six-year-old student was struck and killed
by a school bus after he exited the bus at the school he attended. The
plaintiffs, the student’s parents, filed a negligence action against the
school’s assistant principal, alleging the negligent performance of her
duties in overseeing the unloading of buses contributed to the student’s
death.110 The trial court denied the assistant principal’s motion for
summary judgment, but the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed. 111
The plaintiffs argued that the school transportation handbook, which
provided that school staff should be on duty to supervise the unloading
of buses, created a ministerial duty that the assistant principal
negligently performed.112 The trial court agreed, finding that the this
case was analogous to McDowell v. Smith.113 The court of appeals
disagreed by determining that “the handbook’s requirement that ‘school
staff . . . be on duty to supervise’ children as they exit buses is not
simple, absolute and definite, and does not require the execution of

106. Id. at 798, 824 S.E.2d at 694–95.
107. Id. at 798, 824 S.E.2d at 695.
108. Id. at 799, 824 S.E.2d at 695.
109. 349 Ga. App. 274, 825 S.E.2d 614 (2019).
110. Id. at 274, 825 S.E.2d at 615.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 275, 825 S.E.2d at 615–16.
113. Id. at 276, 825 S.E.2d at 616; see McDowell v. Smith, 285 Ga. 592, 592–94, 678
S.E.2d 922, 923–24 (2009) (holding receptionist’s mandated actions of consulting with
administrator or checking the student’s information card to verify that the person picking
up child was authorized to do so were ministerial because actions were “simple, absolute
and definite, and required the execution of specific tasks without any exercise of
discretion.”).
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specific tasks.”114 Similarly, the duty to “receive” the children was not
simple or definite.115 The court of appeals held that the cited directives
were instead “vague and indefinite, and necessarily require the exercise
of discretion, especially in light of the long-standing rule that the ‘duty
to supervise, control and monitor students is a discretionary
function.’”116 Absent any evidence of actual malice, the court of appeals
held the assistant principal was entitled to official immunity. 117
Interestingly, the court of appeals did not cite Barnett, where the
supreme court recently analyzed supervision of students in the context
of directives found in a faculty handbook.118 Nonetheless, the court of
appeals’ decision is consistent with the Barnett holding—although a
policy may cause certain aspects of student supervision to be
ministerial, the “determination . . . is made on a case-by-case basis, and
the dispositive issue is the character of the specific actions complained
of, not the general nature of the job.”119 And because the duty to
“supervise” and “receive” students exiting buses in Llewelyn did not
provide “simple, absolute, and definite” requirements, the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate a negligently performed ministerial duty. 120
Finally, the holding in King v. King121 provides a seemingly obvious
yet helpful reminder that a public official may only assert official
immunity for actions taken in the performance of his or her official
duties.122 There, the ex-wife of a sheriff’s officer filed suit, alleging that
the sheriff’s officer retaliated against her for making a social media post
about him, which led to her false arrest. 123 Although the sheriff’s officer
prepared an “application of issuance of criminal warrant,” the record
showed that such process was available to private citizens, and there
was no evidence that the sheriff’s officer was acting as a law
enforcement officer when he initiated the process.124 Accordingly, the
district court found that the sheriff’s officer “was not acting in the
performance of his official duties when he initiated a criminal complaint
against [his ex-wife] and is thus not entitled to official immunity.” 125
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Llewelyn, 349 Ga. App. at 277, 825 S.E.2d at 616.
Id.
Id. (quoting McDowell, 285 Ga. at 594, 678 S.E.2d at 924).
See id. at 276–77, 825 S.E.2d at 616–17.
302 Ga. at 849, 809 S.E.2d at 817.
Id. at 848, 809 S.E.2d at 816.
Id.
342 F. Supp. 3d 1364 (M.D. Ga. 2018).
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1381.
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This case also highlights a fundamental difference between how a
public official may be held liable under state versus federal law. While
the sheriff’s officer could not maintain official immunity against the
state law claims, he avoided liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983126 for the
federal law claims because the district court found that he was not
“acting under the color of state law” when he filed the criminal
complaint—a prerequisite to liability under § 1983.127
IV. TAXATION
This year saw three cases dealing with details of appraisal
methodology, three other cases notable for their unusual procedural
postures, and one case concerning the distinction between taxes and
fees. We begin with the methodology.
In White Horse Partners LLLP v. Monroe County Board of Tax
Assessors,128 the plaintiff taxpayer challenged the assessor’s expert’s
methodology in appraising its 250-acre timber tract. The expert was a
member of a third-party appraisal firm which performed a revaluation
of rural properties for the county, and which in this case had resulted in
a more than doubling in the valuation of the subject tract. In
accordance with standard industry practice, the expert testified that he
first used extracted timber values and then used comparable sales to
arrive at a value of the land itself. To determine timber values, he
testified that he made personal visits to timber properties, had cruises
performed on some (but apparently not all) such properties, talked with
two local foresters involved in timber transactions within the county,
and reviewed timber values submitted by property owners. 129 The court
of appeals upheld the admission of the expert’s testimony against the
owner’s assertion that his estimates were speculative, determining that
at most it was partially speculative, which goes merely to weight rather
than admissibility.130
In DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors v. Astor Atl, LLC,131 the
court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer,
who asserted that the Board of Tax Assessors illegally failed to limit the
appraised value of his property to its purchase price. 132 The limitation is

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2019).
See King, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 1374.
348 Ga. App. 603, 824 S.E.2d 57 (2019).
Id. at 604–06, 824 S.E.2d at 58–60.
Id. at 607, 824 S.E.2d at 60.
349 Ga. App. 867, 826 S.E.2d 685 (2019).
Id.
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found in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3),133 which states, “[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of this chapter to the contrary, the transaction amount
of the most recent arm’s length, bona fide sale in any year shall be the
maximum allowable fair market value for the next taxable year.” 134 The
taxpayer had purchased the tracts in question at foreclosure sales,
which the Board argued were not “arm’s length, bona fide sales.” 135 The
Board also pointed to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-1,136 which states the general rule
of returning properties “at the value which would be realized from the
cash sale, but not the forced sale, of the property.” 137 The court,
however, noted that definition of “arm’s length, bona fide sale” as
contained in OCGA § 48-5-2(.1)138 specifically includes “a distress sale,
short sale, bank sale, or sale at public auction.” 139 The court also noted
the “notwithstanding” language in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)140 and the
caveat “except as otherwise provided in this chapter” in O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-1, and found that the limitation to purchase price did apply to a
“bank foreclosure sale pursuant to a deed under power.”141 In so
holding, however, the court did note that a tax sale could be
distinguished, thus affirming the holding but refuting the dicta in
Ballard v. Newton County Board of Tax Assessors.142
Valuation of condominiums at the Tony Sea Island resort was at
issue in Glynn County Board of Assessors v. SIA Propco I, LLC.143 The
superior court had ruled in favor of the taxpayer on its summary
judgment argument that the purchase prices included Sea Island Club
membership rights and that the value of such rights should be excluded
from tax valuation; the court of appeals, however, reversed. 144 The court
of appeals had in fact already addressed the issue of membership rights
with regard to similar Sea Island properties in Morton v. Glynn County

133. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) (2019).
134. DeKalb Cty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 349 Ga. App. at 868, 826 S.E.2d at 687 (citing
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3)).
135. Id. at 867–68, 826 S.E.2d at 686–87.
136. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-1 (2019).
137. Id.
138. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(.1) (2019).
139. DeKalb Cty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 349 Ga. App. at 868, 826 S.E.2d 687 (citing
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(.1)).
140. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3).
141. DeKalb Cty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 349 Ga. App. at 868–69, 826 S.E.2d at 687.
142. Id. at 870, 826 S.E.2d at 688; Ballard v. Newton County, 332 Ga. App. 521, 773
S.E.2d 780 (2015).
143. 830 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
144. Id.
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Board of Tax Assessors,145 holding there that the value of such rights
should not be excluded from value.146 The taxpayer here, and the
superior court, attempted to distinguish that case based on an
inconsistency between testimony of a witness and the ownership
documents concerning certain aspects of the membership rights; the
court of appeals, however, held that any such inconsistency should have
been construed against the taxpayer for purposes of summary
judgment.147
Turning to the procedural quagmires, this year saw a return to the
court of appeals in the running disputes between MMT Holdings, LLC
and the City of Dublin School District. In a case discussed here last
year, City of Dublin School District v. MMT Holdings, LLC,148 the court
held that the School District was immune from the taxpayer’s refund
claim based on its allegation that certain school taxes had not been
properly approved by the voters.149 Thereafter, the School District
sought an order from the trial court directing the City of Dublin to
disburse the tax collections to it. The trial court denied that request
because the refund action remained pending against the City and the
merits of MMT’s allegation had not been resolved, and the School
District appealed.150 This time around, in City of Dublin School District
v. MMT Holdings, LLC,151 the court ruled against the School District,
finding the trial court’s order was not a final order, the School District
lacked standing, and the School District failed to obtain a certificate of
immediate review.152
This year, in Henry County School District v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
Inc.,153 the school district was unhappy with its county’s decision not to
continue a fight over a taxpayer’s claimed freeport exemption, but it
found no relief. The taxpayer, Home Depot, claimed a freeport
exemption on certain inventory, which the Board of Tax Assessors
denied. The Board of Equalization upheld the denial, but the superior
court reversed and ruled in favor of Home Depot.154 The Board of Tax
Assessors chose not to appeal that ruling, which apparently did not sit

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

294 Ga. App. 901, 670 S.E.2d 528 (2008).
Id. at 905, 670 S.E.2d at 531.
SIA Propco I, LLC, 830 S.E.2d at 404–06.
346 Ga. App. 546, 816 S.E.2d 494 (2018).
Id.
Id.
830 S.E.2d 487 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
Id. at 491.
348 Ga. App. 723, 824 S.E.2d 622 (2019).
Id. at 723–24, 825 S.E.2d at 622–23.

[11] LOCAL GOVERNMENT-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/26/2019 11:13 AM

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

205

well with the school district, so two months later the school district filed
a motion to intervene.155 The trial court denied that motion and the
court of appeals affirmed.156 In affirming, the court noted not only that
the motion to intervene was untimely but also that “only taxpayers or
the tax assessor may appeal decisions of the board of equalization to the
superior court,” and further that the circumstances here did not reach
the level of the “strong showing” required for post-judgment
intervention.157
In Love v. Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors,158 a group of
citizens sued over the issue of whether the interest of Atlanta Falcons
Stadium Co., LLC (Stadium Company) in the Mercedes-Benz Stadium
(the New Stadium) was a leasehold subject to ad valorem property
taxation. For their procedural mechanism into court, the citizens sought
mandamus against the Board of Tax Assessors as well as injunctive
relief, all on the premise that the Board had failed to perform its
duties159 under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(a),160 which provides in relevant
part:
It shall be the duty of the county board of tax assessors to investigate
diligently and to inquire into the property owned in the county for
the purpose of ascertaining what real and personal property is
subject to taxation in the county and to require the proper return of
the property for taxation.161

The trial court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss, and the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that the citizens had failed
to show a “clear legal right to relief.”162 In so holding, the court of
appeals noted the evidence that the Board conducted at least some
inquiry on the issue and stated, “[g]iven that the Tax Board is afforded
discretion in how to conduct an investigation, mandamus relief would
be appropriate only if the Board failed entirely to conduct an
investigation and reach a decision regarding the tax status of the
Stadium Company’s interest in the New Stadium.” 163 However, the

155. Id. at 724, 824 S.E.2d at 623.
156. Id. at 723, 824 S.E.2d at 622.
157. Id. at 724–26, 824 S.E.2d 623–24.
158. 348 Ga. App. 309, 821 S.E.2d 575 (2018).
159. Id. at 309, 821 S.E.2d at 578.
160. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(a) (2019).
161. Love, 348 Ga. App. at 317–18, 821 S.E.2d at 583–84 (citing O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-299(a)).
162. Id. at 316–18, 821 S.E.2d at 582–84.
163. Id. at 318, 821 S.E.2d at 584.
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court of appeals reinstated and remanded the citizens’ claims for
injunctive relief by holding that official immunity does not bar such
claims.164 The citizens’ claims concerning the constitutionality of
O.C.G.A. § 10-9-10,165 which creates a tax exemption for the World
Congress Center, were also reinstated.166
Finally, the Georgia Supreme Court issued a significant ruling
concerning
9-1-1
Service
Act167
charges
in
Bellsouth
Telecommunications, LLC v. Cobb County.168 That act imposes a
surcharge on telephone service, which supports Georgia’s 9-1-1
emergency system and provides that telephone service providers shall
collect the charge and remit it to local governments. 169 Cobb County
sued Bellsouth, alleging it had failed to collect the charge in its full
amount from all its customers, and Bellsouth contended (among other
defenses) that the charge was a tax rather than a fee and the county
had no cause of action in tort to collect a tax.170 The Georgia Supreme
Court agreed with Bellsouth by holding that the charge was indeed a
tax on individual telephone customers and that, without express
statutory authority, a county cannot collect a tax through the judicial
system.171 And, although the Act does provide for collection from
individual customers (O.C.G.A. § 9-11-34(b)),172 it does not authorize
suit against telephone companies, which act only as “intermediaries” for
collection.173
V. OPEN RECORDS/OPEN MEETINGS
A. Open Records
Two cases discussed in last year’s edition of the Local Government
Review, wherein the court of appeals was 0–2, have continued their
course through the court system. We will update our review of those
cases and then briefly turn attention to a new district court case
involving a request to stay civil litigation based upon an exception in
the Open Records Act involving criminal records, and a case wherein
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 320–21, 821 S.E.2d at 585.
O.C.G.A. § 10-9-10 (2019).
Love, 348 Ga. App. at 321, 821 S.E.2d at 585–86.
O.C.G.A. § 46-5-134 (2019).
305 Ga. 144, 824 S.E.2d 233 (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 46-5-134.
Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 144, 824 S.E.2d at 234.
Id. at 151–55, 824 S.E.2d at 239–42.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-34(b) (2019).
Bellsouth, 305 Ga. at 152–54, 824 S.E.2d at 240–41.
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the court of appeals considered the application of the provision to collect
attorney’s fees under an action brought pursuant to the Open Records
Act.
As you may recall, we previously reviewed Campaign for
Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research Foundation,174 wherein
Consumer Credit Research Foundation (CCR) entered into an
agreement with the Kennesaw State University Research and Service
Foundation (KSU), and in accordance a KSU professor conducted
statistical research and published a paper relating to “payday” loans.
The Campaign for Accountability (CFA) sent a request to KSU under
the Georgia Open Records Act for copies of certain correspondence
relating to the research. KSU did not oppose the release and notified
CCR that it planned to release the redacted correspondence. CCR
objected and filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to
prevent the release.175 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals
by adopting a narrower reading of Bowers v. Shelton,176 concluding that
the holding in that case referred only to records within certain specific
exemptions from the Act’s general disclosure requirement, and O.C.G.A.
§ 50-18-72(a)177 of the Act did not bar a state agency from publicly
releasing records, unless the specific exemption listed in the statute
that covers the records at issue expressly prohibits disclosure. 178 The
court held that, because the specific exemptions for materials related to
academic research do not expressly prohibit disclosure, the records at
issue were not subject to prohibition against disclosure. 179 The court
noted that it did not disapprove the holding in Bowers that parties with
an interest in nondisclosure may pursue a lawsuit to seek compliance
with the Act.180 Further, the court stated that nothing prevented
agencies from promising by contract not to disclose information that the
Act does not require them to disclose. 181 Accordingly, the court of

174. Consumer Credit Research Found. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 341
Ga. App. 323, 800 S.E. 2d 24 (2017), rev’d sub nom., Campaign for Accountability v.
Consumer Credit Research Found., 303 Ga. 828, 815 S.E.2d 841 (2018); see also Henry et
al., supra note 1, at 194–95.
175. Consumer Credit Research Foundation, 341 Ga. App. at 323–24, 800 S.E.2d at 25.
176. 265 Ga. 247, 453 S.E.2d 741 (1995).
177. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a) (2019).
178. Campaign for Accountability, 303 Ga. at 830–36, 815 S.E.2d at 844–48.
179. Id. at 830–31, 815 S.E.2d at 844–45.
180. Id. at 836, 815 S.E.2d at 848.
181. Id. at 837, 815 S.E.2d at 849.
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appeals vacated its prior judgment and adopted the decision of the
supreme court.182
We also previously looked at Smith v. Northside Hospital, Inc.,183
wherein the Supreme Court of Georgia analyzed whether documents
created by an organization on behalf of a government agency were
subject to the Open Records Act.184 The Fulton County Hospital
Authority (Authority) was created in 1966, and it opened Northside
Hospital, which it owned and operated for approximately twenty-five
years. Looking to improve the hospital’s operations, the Authority
restructured in the 1990s through a long-term lease of the hospital and
related assets for operation by a private, charitable, non-profit
corporation. Attorney E. Kendrick Smith brought this action to compel
Northside Hospital, Inc., and its parent company, Northside Health
Services, Inc. (collectively, Northside), to produce specific documents
related to the acquisitions of four privately owned physician groups.
Northside responded to the request, asserting that it was a private,
nonprofit hospital that was not subject to the Open Records Act and,
even assuming it was subject to the Act, the requested documents were
exempt from production under a variety of exemptions. 185 The supreme
court granted certiorari to consider whether the documents in question
were “‘public records’ within the meaning of the Act.” 186 The parties
agreed that the Authority was an “agency” as defined by the Act and
Northside was not; the only question was whether the documents
sought were “‘prepared, maintained or received by’ Northside ‘in the
performance of a service or function for or on behalf of’ the
Authority.”187
The supreme court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals with
Justice Nels Peterson writing: “The corporation’s operation of the
hospital and other leased facilities is a service it performs on behalf of
the [county’s] agency, and so records related to that operation are public
records.”188 The case was remanded and the trial court was directed to
apply the correct standard and determine how closely related the

182. Consumer Credit Research Found. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 347
Ga. App. 188, 189, 818 S.E.2d 260, 260 (2018).
183. Smith v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 336 Ga. App. 843, 783 S.E2d 480 (2016), rev’d, 302
Ga. 517, 807 S.E.2d 909 (2017), modified on remand, 347 Ga. App. 700, 820 S.E.2d 758
(2018); see also Henry et al., supra note 1, at 195–96.
184. Smith II, 302 Ga. at 517–18, 807 S.E.2d at 912.
185. Id. at 518–20, 807 S.E.2d at 912–13.
186. Id. at 518, 807 S.E.2d at 912.
187. Id. at 521, 807 S.E.2d at 914.
188. Id. at 517, 807 S.E.2d at 912.
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acquisitions were to the operation of the hospital’s facilities. 189 Justice
Melton concurred to emphasize that he felt it “defies credulity that
Northside could be completely separate from and do nothing ‘on behalf
of’ the Authority when it was the Authority itself that ‘created’
Northside for the purpose of carrying out virtually all of its public
duties.”190
In an October 2018 holding, the court of appeals affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.191 Before remand, the court of appeals
had one additional issue to address, that being Northside’s cross-appeal
wherein Northside argued that the trial court abused its discretion by
entering a protective order which prohibited it from seeking
information during discovery regarding the identity and motives of
individuals or entities on whose behalf Smith allegedly initiated the
action, which, as the result of the supreme court’s reversal, was no
longer a moot issue.192 Northside conceded the identity and purpose of
Smith’s client had no bearing on whether he had standing, but argued
simply that it was entitled in discovery to know the identity to
determine “whether the client is a competitor of Northside seeking to
pursue the case to gain economic value and for competitive purposes.”193
Given the broad discretion that a trial court has over discovery matters,
Georgia’s strong public policy in favor of open government, the minimal
probative value of the identity and motives of Smith’s client, and
relying upon the reasoning in Atchison v. Hospital Authority of St.
Mary’s,194 the court of appeals found Northside’s argument
unconvincing and affirmed the trial court’s grant of Smith’s motion for
protective order.195 The case was then remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the supreme court’s decision. 196
We now turn our attention to a new case, Hammonds v. Gray
Transportation, Inc.,197 which arose out of a catastrophic automobile
accident resulting in the severe injury and ultimate death of Betty Jean
Nipper. Defendants Gray Transportation and Elias filed a Motion
asking the court to stay the proceedings until the state resolved its
criminal charges against Defendant Elias, arguing that O.C.G.A.

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 531, 807 S.E.2d at 921.
Id. at 532, 807 S.E.2d 921 (Melton, P.J., concurring).
Smith III, 347 Ga. App. at 700, 820 S.E.2d at 760.
Id. at 700–01, 820 S.E.2d at 760.
Id. at 705, 820 S.E.2d at 764.
245 Ga. 494, 265 S.E.2d 801 (1980).
Smith III, 347 Ga. App at 705–10, 820 S.E.2d at 764–66.
Id. at 710, 820 S.E.2d at 766.
371 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (M.D. Ga. 2019).

[11] LOCAL GOVERNMENT-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

210

MERCER LAW REVIEW

11/26/2019 11:13 AM

[Vol. 71

§ 50-18-72(a)(4)198 prevents the disclosure of Georgia’s investigative
reports of the subject accident while the charges against Defendant
Elias are pending and that Elias would not be able to respond to the
plaintiffs’ written discovery or otherwise testify in his own defense
without waiving his Fifth Amendment rights in the underlying criminal
charges.199 The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia found that a stay was not appropriate.200 After reviewing
various instructive cases from non-binding sources, the district court
found201 the decision in Golden Quality Ice Cream Company v. Deerfield
Specialty Papers202 particularly helpful, wherein the court considered
the following factors in deciding whether to stay a civil case during the
pendency of a parallel criminal case:
(1) the interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with this
litigation or any particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to
plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden which any particular aspect of the
proceedings may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience of the
court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial
resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil
litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil and
criminal litigation.203

Recognizing the court’s discretion in matters such as these, and
applying the above factors to this case, the court gave great weight to
the plaintiff’s desire to resolve this dispute expeditiously and stated it
would not “allow this case to linger to avoid such speculative harms”
and denied the motion to stay.204
In Geer v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.,205 the court of appeals
considered the application of the provision to collect attorney’s fees
under an action brought pursuant to the Open Records Act. 206 The
violation of Georgia’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation) statute207 was the underlying claim.208 Geer requested

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) (2019).
Hammonds, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 1344–45.
Id. at 1345–46.
Id.
87 F.R.D. 53, 55–56 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
Id. at 56.
Hammonds, 371 F. Supp. 3d at 1346–47.
350 Ga. App. 127, 828 S.E.2d 108 (2019).
Id. at 127, 828 S.E.2d at 109.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (2019).
Geer, 350 Ga. App. at 127, 828 S.E.2d at 109.
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copies of Putney’s board meeting minutes and filed suit to get the court
to compel disclosure under the Open Records Act. 209
In responding to the complaint, Putney made a counterclaim for
“attorney[‘s] fees under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73(b),210 which allows for an
award of attorney[‘s] fees in any action brought under the Georgia Open
Records Act ‘in which the court determines that either party acted
without substantial justification either in not complying with this
chapter or in instituting the litigation.’” 211 Geer responded by making a
motion to strike the counterclaim alleging it violated the anti-SLAPP
statute because it “was an effort to chill his right to petition the
government and his right of free speech.”212 The trial court denied that
motion and Geer appealed.213
The court of appeals “has not yet addressed whether the anti-SLAPP
statute applies to claims for attorney[‘s] fees under OCGA § 50-18-73(b).
Nevertheless, we conclude that this case is completely controlled by our
decision in Paulding County v. Morrison.”214 In Paulding County, the
court held that the statute did not preclude the right to seek attorney’s
fees.215 Therefore, the court of appeals held that the anti-SLAPP statute
did not apply to the counterclaim and affirmed the lower court’s
decision to deny Geer’s motion to strike.216
B. Open Meetings
In the last edition of the Local Government Review, we addressed a
court of appeals decision, Martin v. City of College Park.217 In Martin, a
city employee, Chawanda Martin, was terminated and sued alleging
that the termination violated the Open Meetings Act because the City
Council made the interim appointment without a public vote; thus, the
officials lacked authority to terminate her city employment.218
209. Id.
210. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73(b) (2019).
211. Geer, 350 Ga. App. at 127, 828 S.E.2d at 109.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 128, 828 S.E.2d at 109 (citing Paulding Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Morrison,
316 Ga. App. 806, 810–11, 728 S.E.2d 921, 924–25 (2012)).
215. 316 Ga. App. at 811, 728 S.E.2d at 925.
216. Geer, 350 Ga. App. at 128, 828 S.E.2d at 110.
217. Martin v. City of Coll. Park, 342 Ga. App. 289, 289, 802 S.E.2d 292, 293
(2017), cert. granted, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 31 (Ga. Jan. 16, 2018), rev’d in part sub nom., City
of Coll. Park v. Martin, 304 Ga. 488, 818 S.E.2d 620 (2018), and vacated sub nom., Martin
v. City of Coll. Park, 349 Ga. App. 852, 826 S.E.2d 685 (2019); see also Henry et al., supra
note 1, at 198–99.
218. Martin, 342 Ga. App. at 290–91, 802 S.E.2d at 293–94.
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Martin argued that the appointments for interim positions needed to
be conducted in an open vote under the Open Meetings Act. Since that
appeal, the City of College Park and the other defendants appealed to
the Supreme Court of Georgia,219 which conducted a de novo review.220
However, the court disagreed based on the plain language meaning of
the statute.221 The court, applying Deal v. Coleman,222 reasoned that the
statute must be viewed “in its most natural and reasonable way, as an
ordinary speaker of the English language would.” 223
Focusing on exemptions to the Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A.
§ 50-14-3(b)(2),224 allows for executive session for appointments and
employment. Specifically, the court noted that “[t]he vote on any matter
covered by this paragraph shall be taken in public and minutes of the
meeting as provided in this chapter shall be made available.” 225
The phrase ‘the vote . . . shall be taken in public’ employs the use of a
definite article (‘the’) and is therefore referential, presupposing a
required action. Simply put, the language does not mandate a vote on
a relevant employment decision, it simply references such vote and
requires that any such vote be taken in public.226

In reversing the decision, the supreme court held that the lower court
misapplied the Open Meetings Act; specifically, the court of appeals
“determined, without discussion, that the public vote language in
subsection (b) (2) requires the city council to have voted on [the] interim
appointment as city manager (and presumably any future interim
appointments).”227
The supreme court held that the Open Meetings Act did not require a
vote by city council on interim appointment of a city manager. 228
However, the City’s charter needed to be reviewed to determine a vote
was necessary.229 “We conclude that the Court of Appeals should have
first determined whether the charter for the City of College Park
219. City of Coll. Park, 304 Ga. at 489, 818 S.E.2d at 621.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 489–90, 818 S.E.2d at 621–22.
222. 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).
223. City of Coll. Park, 304 Ga. at 489, 818 S.E.2d at 621 (quoting Deal, 294 Ga. at
172–73, 751 S.E.2d at 341).
224. O.C.G.A. § 50-14-3(b)(2) (2019).
225. City of Coll. Park, 304 Ga. at 490, 818 S.E.2d at 622 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-3(b)(2)).
226. Id. (emphasis omitted).
227. Id. (emphasis omitted).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 490–91, 818 S.E.2d at 622.
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actually requires a vote to effectuate such an interim appointment
before considering the applicability of the public-vote requirement of
the Open Meetings Act.”230
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, in part, to
determine the charter requirements for voting on interim
appointments.231 Neither the lower court nor the parties discussed the
“key issue” of whether a vote is required when appointing an interim
city manager per the city charter. 232 Since it was a factual
determination, the supreme court remanded for the lower court to
review and determine the requirements of the City’s charter. 233
In Rosser v. Clyatt,234 the court of appeals applied the statutory
interpretation of the supreme court in Martin in the reasoning in the
interpretation of the SLAPP statute. 235 “[C]onsistent with the design of
the Open Meetings Act, the plain language of (b)(2) requires that when
a vote on a relevant employment matter is taken, it must be taken in
public.”236
The Georgia appellate courts made brief mention of the Acts within
the context of other cases. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the
Georgia Ports Authority is an agency subject to the Open Records and
Meetings Acts.237
VI. ZONING AND LAND USE238
In Hoechstetter v. Pickens County,239 the Supreme Court of Georgia
addressed the sufficiency of information required to be presented to a
County Board of Commissioners under Georgia’s Zoning Procedures

230. Id. at 489, 818 S.E.2d at 621.
231. Id. at 491, 818 S.E.2d at 622.
232. Id. at 490–91, 818 S.E.2d at 622.
233. Id. at 491, 818 S.E.2d at 622.
234. 348 Ga. App. 40, 821 S.E.2d 140 (2018), cert. denied, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 210 (Ga.
Apr. 1, 2019).
235. Id. at 53, 821 S.E.2d at 152.
236. Id.
237. Ga. Ports Auth. v. Lawyer, 304 Ga. 667, 679, 821 S.E.2d 22, 31 (2018) (“The Ports
Authority appears to come within the scope of the Open Meetings Act, see OCGA
§ 50-14-1(a)(1)(A), the Open Records Act, see OCGA § 50-18-70(b)(1), and the Georgia
Records Act, see OCGA § 50-18-91(1). In addition, Georgia law considers the Ports
Authority an ‘arm of the State’ against which punitive damages cannot be awarded.”).
238. This section provides a brief overview of selected decisions. For further analysis of
developments in zoning case law this year, please see the article by Newton Galloway and
Steven Jones, appearing in this issue.
239. 303 Ga. 786, 815 S.E.2d 50 (2018).
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Law (ZPL), O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1 through 36-66-6,240 in order to meet the
notice and hearing requirement241 that a public hearing constitute a
“meaningful opportunity to be heard.”242 In the procedure at issue, the
Pickens County Planning Commission held a hearing where neighbors
voiced opposition to a conditional use permit application, and then sent
a one-page memorandum recommending approval—with no details of
the hearing included—to the Board of Commissioners, which then
approved the application some two months later.243 The neighbors
argued they were denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the
application because the Board of Commissioners’ decision, some two
months after the Planning Commission hearing, was too attenuated
and did not have any actual information about their objections to
consider, since no such information was in the memorandum. 244 After
the superior court and court of appeals held for defendants by holding
that the one hearing before the Planning Commission was sufficient,
the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that, since the Board of
Commissioners had no information about the nature of the plaintiffs’
objections, the plaintiffs had been denied a “meaningful” opportunity to
be heard, the guarantee at the heart of the ZPL’s notice and hearing
requirements.245
In BPP069, LLC v. Lindfield Holdings, LLC,246 the court of appeals
reiterated the principle that a seller’s alleged misrepresentation of the
zoning of a property cannot be the basis of a fraud action. 247 The buyers
of the property brought an action for fraud, alleging that the seller
misrepresented the property as being zoned for multi-family
development under a nonconforming use, whereas in reality it had lost
its nonconforming use status, and the City of Newnan had passed
demolition resolutions concerning the property.248 The court of appeals
240. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1–36-66-6 (2019).
241. Hoechstetter, 303 Ga. at 786–87, 815 S.E. 2d at 51–52.
242. City of Roswell v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 274 Ga. 130, 131, 549 S.E.2d 90, 91–92
(2001).
243. Hoechstetter, 303 Ga. at 786–87, 815 S.E.2d at 51.
244. Id. at 787–88, 815 S.E.2d at 51–52.
245. Id. at 787–88, 815 S.E.2d at 52. The court went on to note that
[i]f an adequate record of the hearing before the Planning Commission had
been made and transmitted to the Board—such that the final zoning decision
of the Board could be said to have been meaningfully informed by what
happened at the hearing—the hearing before the Planning Commission
perhaps might satisfy the requirements of the ZPL.
Id. at 788, 815 S.E.2d at 52.
246. 346 Ga. App. 577, 816 S.E.2d 755 (2018).
247. Id. at 585, 816 S.E.2d 761.
248. Id. at 581, 816 S.E.2d 758–59.
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affirmed summary judgment for the defendant-sellers, holding that,
since zoning is a legislative function of a County, a property’s zoning
status is a matter of law, and therefore, nondisclosure or
misrepresentation of zoning status cannot serve as a basis for a fraud
action, notwithstanding any misrepresentation or concealment by a
seller.249
In Carson v. Brown,250 the court of appeals provided further guidance
on what does and does not constitute a zoning “decision” which must be
appealed by application for discretionary appeal. 251 The plaintiff
purchased a property zoned for development into residential lots at
9,000-square-foot minimum size. The County subsequently issued a
moratorium on development of lots smaller than 14,750 square feet, and
the plaintiff, undaunted, submitted a land disturbance permit
application to develop the smaller lots. The County’s planner technician
wrote to the plaintiff, releasing back his plan due to the moratorium,
and the County Attorney subsequently wrote that the application would
not be processed and the technician’s letter constituted a rejection of the
same. The plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandamus against the
technician and others, seeking an order directing that the application
be processed.252 The trial court denied the petition, and the plaintiff
filed an application for discretionary appeal to the Georgia Supreme
Court, which transferred the application to the court of appeals. 253 The
court of appeals granted the application, but did so after concluding
that he had a right to a direct appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(7),254
which provides for direct appeals from denials of mandamus. 255 On
appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiff was required to file an
application for discretionary appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1)256 on
grounds that he was appealing the trial court’s review of a local
administrative agency’s decision—namely, the release of the plaintiff’s
application back to him.257 The court held that this release did not
constitute a zoning “decision” which would trigger the requirement of
application for discretionary appeal, since the County never accepted

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 585–86, 816 S.E.2d 761–62.
348 Ga. App. 689, 824 S.E.2d 605 (2018).
Id. at 696, 824 S.E.2d at 612.
Id. at 693, 824 S.E.2d at 610.
Id. at 690, 824 S.E.2d at 608.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(7) (2019).
Carson, 348 Ga. App. at 690, 824 S.E.2d at 608.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) (2019).
Carson, 348 Ga. App. at 690–91, 824 S.E.2d at 608.
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the application in the first place due to the moratorium, and therefore
never reached the application’s merits.258
Finally, in Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission v.
Epic Midstream, LLC,259 a decision which the court of appeals expressly
designated as physical precedent only,260 the court reiterated the
longstanding precept that the “substantial evidence” required by
O.C.G.A. § 5-4-12(b)261 to support a zoning decision means “any
evidence.”262 There, the Macon-Bibb Planning and Zoning Commission
(Commission) denied a fuel-handling company’s application for a
conditional use permit to build and operate a rail spur and ethanol
facility after nearby residents voiced concerns about noise and fuel
leaks, citing uncertainty of what ground pollution currently existed or
would be augmented following a past incident involving contamination
from a fuel pipeline.263 The Commission denied the company’s motion
for rehearing, and the company petitioned the superior court for
certiorari; the superior court reversed the decision, with the
Commission’s appeal following.264 The court of appeals reversed back in
the Commission’s favor, determining that the specific issues raised
concerning noise, contamination, and hazardous materials pertinent to
the tract in question constituted evidence supporting the Commission’s
decision, and therefore there was “substantial evidence” to support that
decision.265
VII. WHISTLEBLOWERS
Despite a previous uptick in reported activity for claims under the
Georgia Whistleblower Act (GWA), 266 that trend did not carry itself over
into this survey period. Other than a handful of unreported,
unremarkable federal court decisions, 267 there is only one reported
258. Id. at 697, 824 S.E.2d at 612–13.
259. 349 Ga. App. 568, 826 S.E.2d 403 (2019).
260. Id. at 576, 826 S.E.2d at 409.
261. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-12(b) (2019).
262. Epic Midstream, LLC, 349 Ga. App. at 572, 826 S.E.2d at 407.
263. Id. at 568–71, 826 S.E.2d at 404–06.
264. Id. at 571–72, 826 S.E.2d at 406–07.
265. Id. at 575–76, 826 S.E.2d at 409.
266. Henry et al., supra note 1, at 206; O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4 (2019).
267. See, e.g., Chambers v. Cherokee Cty., 743 F. App’x 960 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming
trial court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over whistleblower claim since
federal law claims were all dismissed); Powell v. Muscogee Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 4:17-cv-185
(CDL), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4150, at *7–8 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 2019) (denying Muscogee
County School District’s motion for summary judgement on whistleblower’s claim because
genuine issue of material fact existed on whether school district had legitimate
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decision worth mentioning. Make no mistake though, the en banc
decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in Franklin v. Pitts268
(hereinafter Franklin II) warrants considerable attention by those
practicing local government law. For in overturning precedent and in
articulating a new standard to analyze future claims of retaliation
under the GWA, the subtle splits in reasoning that arose among the
court, including from some of the court’s newest members, may also
reveal subtle insights into the various jurisprudential philosophies on
the court.
The facts and circumstances underlying the claims of whistleblower
retaliation in Franklin v. Pitts were familiar to the Georgia Court of
Appeals. As Judge Trent Brown’s majority opinion quickly pointed out,
an earlier iteration of the case had previously been before the court in
which the court had reversed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgement to Fulton County based upon its statute of limitations
defense.269 Nonetheless, the central issue before the court in Franklin II
was whether Dedrain Franklin had actually alleged, as a matter of law,
that she was retaliated against under the GWA.270 And to decide that
question, the en banc court reckoned that it had to overturn its decision
in Freeman v. Smith.271
Recall that prohibited retaliation under the GWA includes “the
discharge, suspension, demotion . . . or any other adverse employment
action taken by a public employer against a public employee in the
terms and conditions of employment.”272 In Franklin II, Dedrain
Franklin contended that the following actions taken by Fulton County
constituted retaliation under the GWA: (a) delaying her request to
attend a training session, (b) changing her job duties, (c) denying her
nonretaliatory reason for denying whistleblower’s promotion); Jordan v. City of Waycross,
No. 5:17-cv-33, 2018 U.S Dist. LEXIS 145543, at *10 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2018) (denying
defendants’ motion for summary judgement on whistleblower’s claim because
plaintiff/whistleblower came within protection of the statute).
268. 349 Ga. 544, 826 S.E.2d 427 (2019).
269. Franklin II, 349 Ga. at 544–46, 826 S.E.2d at 430–31; see Franklin v. Eaves
(Franklin I), 337 Ga. App. 292, 294–300, 787 S.E.2d 265, 268–72 (2016). The court also
reviewed and affirmed the trial court’s decision to open the County’s default in Franklin I.
337 Ga. App. at 292–94, 787 S.E.2d at 267–68.
270. Id. at 547–57, 826 S.E.2d at 432–38.
271. Id. at 552, 826 S.E.2d at 435 (overruling Freeman v. Smith, 324 Ga. App. 426, 750
S.E.2d 739 (2013), “only to the extent that it applied the standard for adverse employment
action in Title VII retaliation cases to a Georgia Whistleblower Act case”). Indeed,
whether it was actually necessary to overrule Freeman triggered special concurrences
from Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Goss. Id. at 560–61, 826 S.E.2d at 440 (Doyle, P.J.,
concurring); id. at 561–63, 826 S.E.2d at 441–42 (Goss, J., concurring).
272. O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(5) (2019).
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requests for leave, and (d) requesting that she document any leave she
were to take.273 Although none of this constituted a discharge,
suspension, or demotion, under the plain language of the GWA,
Franklin nonetheless contended that she was retaliated against
because the Act also defined retaliation to encompass “any other
adverse employment action . . . in the terms and conditions of
employment.”274 And in Freeman, the court appeared to interpret this
phrase to mean any “materially adverse” action which would have the
effect of “dissuad[ing] a reasonable employee” from engaging in the
statutorily-protected disclosure—a standard that Franklin argued
included the above-listed actions.275 But the Franklin II majority not
only disagreed with premise of Franklin’s argument, it also disagreed
with her interpretation of the type of conduct that was encompassed by
the phrase “other adverse employment action.” 276
Tracing the reasoning in Freeman, the majority in Franklin II
observed that the decision appeared to have erroneously relied on the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Company v. White,277 in which the Supreme Court
had announced the “materially adverse” standard governing claims of
retaliation under Title VII.278 This was a mistake, the majority in
Franklin II determined, for one glaringly obvious reason: the statutory
text of the GWA did not closely align with the statutory text of Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision.279 Instead, the statutory text of the
GWA aligned more closely with Title VII’s substantive discrimination
provision.280 Thus, to the extent Freeman “applied the standard for

273. Franklin II, 349 Ga. at 548, 826 S.E.2d at 432. The court assumed without
deciding that Franklin’s allegations that she was denied promotions on two occasions
satisfied the adverse employment action element under the GWA. Id. Ultimately, the
court agreed with the lower court that Franklin could not rebut the County’s legitimate,
nonretaliatory reasons for denying her these promotions. Id. at 557–59, 826 S.E.2d at
438–39. And with respect to Franklin’s allegations that she was denied a third
opportunity to transfer to a new position, the court concluded that Franklin presented no
evidence supporting this allegation, and thus, it did not consider it. Id. at 548 n.3, 826
S.E.2d at 432 n.3.
274. See id. at 545–46, 826 S.E.2d at 430–31.
275. Id. at 549, 826 S.E.2d at 433.
276. Id.
277. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
278. Franklin II, 349 Ga. at 547–52, 826 S.E.2d at 432–35.
279. Id. at 552, 826 S.E.2d at 435.
280. Id. Of course, Presiding Judge Doyle also pointed out that the statutory text of
the GWA likewise did not closely align with the statutory text of Title VII’s substantive
provision either. Id. at 561, 826 S.E.2d at 440 (Doyle, P.J., concurring).
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adverse employment action in Title VII retaliation cases to a Georgia
Whistleblower Act case,” it was overruled.281
The majority in Franklin II then turned to the text of the GWA to
determine what standard governed the analysis of whether a
challenged action constitutes an “adverse employment action.” 282
Employing the cannons noscitur a scoiis and ejusdem generis, the
majority in Franklin II concluded that the “phrase ‘other adverse
employment action’ should be interpreted to mean an employment
action analogous to or of a similar kind or class as ‘discharge,
suspension, or demotion.’”283 And finally, after briefly surveying federal
court decisions that interpreted “the meaning of adverse employment
action in substantive discrimination cases [under Title VII],” the
majority in Franklin II reasoned that Franklin’s complained of conduct
did not, as a matter of law, meet a “threshold level of substantiality . . .
viewed objectively from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
circumstances.”284
Thus, it appears the court in Franklin II heralded in a new standard
under the GWA for judging the type of conduct that constitutes an
“adverse employment action.” Although the majority in Franklin II
admitted that an “adverse employment action need not be an ultimate
employment decision, such as termination, failure to hire or demotion,”
the majority reiterated that the conduct must meet a “threshold level of
substantiality” when viewed objectively.285 This standard differed in
kind, not just in degree, from the standard the court in Freeman
purported to announce.286 “Analysis of whether the challenged action
would have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination is different from an analysis of whether an
employee suffered a serious and material change in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.”287
Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Goss took issue with the majority
in Franklin II in two important respects. First, both agreed that
Freeman did not require overruling.288 To them, Freeman did not
purport to announce that it was adopting the Burlington standard. If
281. Id. at 552, 826 S.E.2d at 435 (majority opinion).
282. Id. at 553, 826 S.E.2d at 435.
283. Id. at 561, 826 S.E.2d at 441 (citations omitted).
284. Id. at 555, 826 S.E.2d at 437 (citations and quotations omitted).
285. Id. (quoting Grimsley v. Marshalls of MA, Inc., 284 F. App’x 604, 608 (11th Cir.
2008).
286. Id. at 551, 826 S.E.2d at 434.
287. Id.
288. See id. at 560, 826 S.E.2d at 440 (Doyle, P.J., concurring in judgement only with
respect to Division I); id. at 561, 826 S.E.2d at 441 (Goss, J., concurring).
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anything, the decision in Freeman merely applied it “without formally
adopting” it.289 The majority in Franklin II addressed this concern in a
footnote. In the majority’s view, “application versus adoption is a
distinction without a difference . . . [and] application of a more narrow
standard in this case, without overruling Freeman, would cause
confusion for the bench and bar as to which standard should be applied
going forward.”290
It is disappointing that none of the opinions engaged in a more
thorough discussion of this point, given that this divergence caused a
clear split of opinions. If in Freeman, the court’s application of the
Burlington standard was truly just dicta, as the Doyle and Goss
concurrences suggested, it would appear that the majority opinion in
Franklin II took a rather functional approach to precedent despite that
it otherwise applied a more formalistic approach (with its heavy
reliance on textualism) elsewhere in the reasoning. For the Doyle and
Goss concurrences (and the judges joining them) what the court had
actually said in Freeman should matter, too. Franklin II provided the
court with a clear opportunity to expound on the importance of reading
its own opinions closely to recognize the often-elusive distinction
between dicta and holding. Unfortunately, none of the judges on the
court seized the opportunity.
The second disagreement between the majority opinion and the
concurrences appeared to turn on the standard the majority in Franklin
II announced for interpreting the phrase “adverse employment action”
moving forward. And subtle differences in jurisprudential philosophy
seemed to animate this disagreement. 291 Statutory text was front and
center in Judge Brown’s majority opinion with several citations to
Scalia and Garner’s Reading Law treatise. 292 Interestingly enough
though, Judge Goss’s special concurrence seemed motivated by
something entirely different: legislative intent. Goss’s brief special
concurrence does not offer much more insight into why he believed the
“General Assembly had . . . intended” a broader meaning of “other
adverse employment action,” aside from the few examples the
289. Id. at 560, 826 S.E.2d at 440 (Doyle, P.J., concurring).
290. Id. at 552 n.6, 826 S.E.2d at 435 n.6 (majority opinion).
291. See id. at 560, 826 S.E.2d at 440 (Doyle, P.J., concurring) (“I do not agree . . . that
the standard the majority proposes to adopt is appropriate based on the plain language of
our statute.”); id. at 562, 826 S.E.2d at 441 (Goss, J., concurring) (“Nothing in the text of
O.C.G.A. § 45-1-5(a)(5) suggests that an employer’s ‘any other adverse employment action’
against the whistleblower must be as serious as a discharge, suspension, or demotion. If
the General Assembly had so intended, it could easily have done so . . . .”).
292. Despite concurring specially, Presiding Judge Doyle, nonetheless, also seemed
motivated by hints of textualism.
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concurrence gives. Nor does it articulate a broader theory of reliance on
legislative intent or some other interpretive lens when interpreting
statutes. But it may, perhaps, highlight a divergence in jurisprudential
philosophy among some members of the court when it comes to
interpreting statutes enacted by the General Assembly. 293
Nonetheless, the following is clear from the court’s opinion in
Franklin II. First, for whistleblowers seeking to recover for retaliatory
conduct that does not rise to the level of a “termination, suspension, or
demotion,” the conduct must be a serious and substantial change in the
terms and conditions of employment to constitute an “adverse
employment action.”294 Second, federal decisions interpreting the
standard for adverse employment action under Title VII’s
discrimination provision, rather than the retaliation provision, remain
persuasive.295 And finally, reliance on a statute’s text remains a strong
leg on which to stand.

293. Compare Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. DuBose, 349 Ga. App. 238, 240–47, 246
n.6, 825 S.E.2d 606, 609–13, 613 n.6 (2019) (interpreting the Georgia Insurer’s Insolvency
Pool Act with a view towards legislative intent and noting “there is no language in the
Pool Act that demonstrates an intent that an insured be fully and completely
compensated under the policy of an insolvent insurer, as suggested by [the Plaintiff].”)
(opinion authored by Goss, J.), with UHS of Anchor, L.P. v. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health,
830 S.E.2d 413, 429 n.98 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019):
To the extent the parties rely upon legislative history . . . we reject their
reliance on same. . . . Indeed, as Georgians, and Americans, we are governed by
laws, not by the intentions of legislators. . . . And as judges, we should only be
concerned with what laws actually say, not with what the people who drafted
the laws intended.
(opinion authored by Dillard, C.J.) (citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted).
294. See Franklin II, 349 Ga. at 555–56, 826 S.E.2d 437–38.
295. See id. at 555–56, 826 S.E.2d at 437.
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